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Economic Democracy
FOCUS PAPER
Most Western societies are proud 
of being political democracies, but 
democracy rarely operates within 
the firm. Democratic governments, in 
principle, can be criticised freely and 
are answerable to those they seek to 
govern. By contrast, managers are 
not, in general, answerable to those 
they seek to manage, and even the 
mildest criticism can be dangerous. 
In capitalist firms the “right to 
manage” is linked to the ownership 
of capital and includes the right to:
• decide what and how much to 
produce
• decide on how the product is 
priced
• decide what techniques of 
production to adopt
• decide what research and 
development to carry out
• decide on making new 
investments and scrapping 
existing ones
• allocate workers to tasks
• allocate internal rewards such 
as promotion
• hire and fire workers
A self-managed (or labour-managed) 
firm is one in which:
• the right to manage rests with 
workers not owners
• management is democratic not 
hierarchical
• workers’ rewards are linked 
to the firm’s performance in 
some way (perhaps by a share 
of profits, revenue or income 
per worker), and not by a fixed 
wage.
The most obvious examples of self-
managed firms under capitalism are 
workers’ cooperatives. The empirical 
evidence (see e.g. Fakhfakh et 
al, 2012) shows that cooperatives 
are at least as productive as their 
capitalist counterparts, and their 
members report a high quality of 
working life. However, cooperatives 
account for only 3% - 6% of GDP in 
most Western countries. In a “free 
market” economy there is apparently 
nothing to stop workers forming a 
cooperative if they believed it would 
offer benefits superior to those 
available in a conventional capitalist 
firm.  These facts lead to the 
notorious “Pangloss Theorem”: What 
School of Economics
JANUARY 2016
The form of 
association... 
which if 
mankind 
continue to improve, 
must be expected in the 
end to predominate, 
is not that which can 
exist with capitalist as 
chief, and workpeople 
without a voice in the 
management, but 
the association of the 
labourers themselves 
on terms of equality, 
collectively owning 
the capital with which 
they carry on their 
operations, and working 
under managers elected 
and removable by 
themselves.
John Stuart Mill
Principles of Political 
Economy, 1848
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‘Workers’ cooperatives are at least as productive 
as their capitalist counterparts, and yet they 
account for a relatively small proportion of GDP 
in most countries. Donald A R George describes 
research which aims to explain this paucity 
of workers’ cooperatives by reference to their 
financing and property rights structures.
by Donald A R George
is, is optimal and its corollary: No 
reform is necessary or desirable. 
Doesn’t the paucity of workers’ 
cooperatives under capitalism 
prove that this form of business 
organisation must somehow be 
fatally flawed? There are many 
objections to the Pangloss Theorem 
which lie outside the scope of 
this short paper. Nonetheless, 
the puzzling paucity of workers’ 
cooperatives under capitalism calls 
for some explanation. The literature 
contains a well-developed set of 
hypotheses (some of which have 
been tested empirically) relating the 
problems of workers’ cooperatives 
to their financing and property rights 
structures. For example, theory 
suggests that external finance and 
individual property rights should 
generate better performance than 
internal finance and collective 
property rights. This raises an 
immediate issue for cooperatives. 
Under capitalism, equity finance 
is not available to cooperatives 
because it would transfer some 
control rights to outside owners, 
thus violating the principle that the 
right to manage rests solely with 
workers. But relying entirely on debt 
would impose excessive risk on 
cooperative members. 
My 1993 book Economic 
Democracy analysed the 
relationship between the financing 
and property rights structure 
of workers’ cooperatives, and 
their economic behaviour and 
performance. There have been 
significant additions to the 
literature since 1993, as well as 
developments of the cooperative 
business model. I am currently 
(January 2016), therefore, in the 
early stages of a research project 
designed to re-visit these issues. 
Cooperatives in Italy, Australia and 
New Zealand display wide variation 
in their financing and property rights 
structures. They therefore provide 
a useful source of data on these 
issues.  The proposed methodology 
of the study will be centred on the 
estimation of augmented production 
functions for workers’ cooperatives, 
in labour embodied and 
disembodied forms. This approach 
requires first distinguishing 
member-labour from non-member 
labour, and defining a vector of 
augmenting variables, chosen to 
reflect the issues listed above. 
Examples might be variables 
which reflect the extent of collective 
v. individual ownership, the extent 
to which finance is internal, or a 
dummy variable to reflect tradable 
membership. The research will 
be conducted in cooperation with 
colleagues at EURICSE (European 
Research Institute on Cooperatives 
and Social Enterprise, University 
of Trento, Italy), University of W 
Australia (Perth, Australia) and 
NZ Coops (Auckland, New 
Zealand).
www.econ.ed.ac.uk
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I am the academic lead of a MOOC (massive open online 
course) project on cooperatives being developed together 
with colleagues from the University of Edinburgh Business 
School, the James Hutton Institute and the University of St. 
Andrews Management School. The research project described 
above is likely to generate spin-off benefits for the MOOC. 
The MOOC team believes that there is widespread interest 
around the world in cooperatives as an alternative to the 
capitalist corporation. We further believe that economics and 
other social sciences can focus and sharpen the debate on 
cooperatives. Having taken the course, students will be better 
placed to participate in public discussion on cooperatives, or to 
join a cooperative or even start a new one.
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